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pra, 71 A.C. 609, 613, 78 Cal.Rptr. 718, 455
P.2d 822; Jones v. Workmen's Compo App.
Bd., supra, 68 Cal.2d 476, 479-480, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 544, 439 P.2d 648; Standard Rectifier Corp. V. Workmen's Compo App. Bel.
(1%6) 65 Cal.2d 287, 292, 54 Cal.Rptr.
100, 419 P.2d 164; Allied Compo Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1%1) 57
Cal.Zd 115, 122, 17 Cal.Rptr. 817, 367
P.2d 409; Liberty Mut. Ins. CO. V. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1948) 33 CaI.2d 89,
94, 199 P.2d 302), the referee here relies
upon no medical authority in concluding

that petitioner is not disabled from performing the lifting required in his occupation. Both Dr. Messinger and Dr.
Dedinsky, the only two physicians who have
seen or treated petitioner since his tempo-

McCOMB, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I would affirm the decision of
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board.
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83 Cal.Rptr. 217
Thurlow E. COON et al., Plaintiffs, Cross..
defendant and Appellants,
Y.

Louis FREEMAN et al., Defendants, Cross..
complainants and Respondents.
L. A. 29662.

rary disability payments ceased, have concluded that petitioner cannot perform work
requiring lifting. Neither doctor has· re-

Sup~me

Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 15, 1970.

leased petitioner from the lifting limita-

tion. In essence, the referee's report confronts petitioner with the grisly choice of

lowing the medical views of the referee. 23

Action for declaratory relief. The
Superior Court, San Diego County, George
R. Kirk, J., rendered judgment, and appeal
was taken. The Supreme Court, Traynor,

[8j We hold that the appeals board and
the referee lacked substantial evidence in

law provision that "member" includes each
person signing articles of nonstock corpo-

concluding that petitioner was not suffering
from temporary disability which would entitle him to temporary disability compensa-

ration and each person admitted to membership therein, and general nonprofit corporation law provision that provisions of

tion.

general corporation law apply to nonprofit
corporations except as to matters specifically otherwise provided for in general
nonprofit corporation law, and general
nonprofit corporation law provision that
directors are members of nonprofit corporation whose articles or bylaws do not provide for members as such or which has no
members other than directors, directors
and not merely remaining incorporators,
were members of nonprofit corporation

obeying the medical advice of his treating
physician or risking further injury by fol-

C.

The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board is annulled and the
cause remanded to that board for proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
TRAYNOR, C. J., and PETERS,
MOSK, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ.,
conCUT.
23. The referee disclosed his attitude toward
the uncontradicted medical advice of Dr.
Dedinsky, the insurance carrier's doctor,
and Dr. Messinger, the doctor retained by
petitioner's attorney, by observing, "He
does not think: he could go back to this
type of work, because he cannot lift;
463 P.2d-28Va

J.,

held that under general corporation

however, he has not tried lifting." (Italics added.) The doctors have forbidden
petitioner to lift anything heavier than
25 pounds, much less the 200 to 250
pound stock found at his former employment.
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whose bylaws provided for membership but
which had admitted no new members.
Affirmed.

Morrow & Young and Floyd L Morrow,
San Diego, for defendants, cross-complainants and respondents.

Opinion, Ca1.App., 77 Ca1.Rptr. 448,
vacated.

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.

I. This action was apparendy taken to
comply with section 9606 of the Corporation Code, which provides: "Every nonprofit corporation shall keep a membership book containing the name and

address of each member. Termination of
any membership shall be recorded in the
book, together with the date on which the
membership ceased."

Plaintiffs Thurlow E. Coon and Tom
Sherrard appeal from a judgment in an ac~
tion for declaratory relief that determined
I. Corporations ~170
the membership of Basic Economic EducaUndel' general corporation law provition, Inc., a California nonprofit corporasion that "member" includes each person
tion, and the validity of the acts of Basic's
signing articles of nonstock corporation
board of directors.
and each person admi~ted to membership
Coon and Sherrard together with Gortherein, and general nonprofit corporation
don
Gran, Sidney Evans, and Henry B.
law provision that provisions of general
Cramer
formed Basic on June 10, 1960 for
corporation law apply to nonprofit corpothe
stated
purpose of education in economrations except as to matters specifically
les.
Neither
the articles of incorporation
otherwise provided for in general nonprofit corporation law, and general nonprofit nor the by-laws provided for members, but
corporation law provision that directors the articles named the five incorporators
are members of nonprofit corporation as the directors.
On April 22, 1965 Coon resigned from
whose articles or bylaws do not provide
for members as such or" which has no the board of directors, and on April 30, the
members other than directors, directors, remaining directors elected Louis Freeman
and not. merely remaining incorporators, to fill the vacancy. In May 1965 Gordon
were members of nonprofit corporation Gran resigned, and the board elected Everwhose bylaws provided for membership but ett Seeley in his place. Friction developed
which had admitted no new members. thereafter between Sherrard and the other
West's Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 104, 9002, 9603. members of the board In December 1966,
at a meeting that Sherrard declined to at~
2. Estoppel 0$;>87
tend, the other board members reelected
Provision added to bylaws of nonprof- themselves as directors and elected Irene
it corporation to effect that in event of Hickman as a director in place of Sherdissolution the remaining assets would be rard.
distributed to organization exempt from
In February 1967 Basic initiated a mem~
federal income taxes did not estop corpora- bership book,! which listed the five direction to deny that two of the original incor- tors and Sherrard as members. Sherrard
porators described as members in the pro- then told Coon and Gran that in his opinvision were members, where the two incor- ion they were still members of Basic even
porators were not misled thereby and did though they had not been active in its afnot change their position to their detriment fairs since their resignations from the
in reliance thereon.
board of directors. Gran then resigned
again and thus made clear he had severed
all connection with Basic. About the same
Tom Sherrard, in pro. per., and Richard time Sidney Evans died, and the board
A. Thomas, San Diego, for plaintiffs, elected Duval Jaros as a director in his
place.
cross-defendants and appellants.

COON v. FREEMAN

Cal.

443

Cite &8463 P.2d 441

Early in April 1967 Coon and Sherrard
called a meeting for April 20 of the three
remaining incorporators, Coon, Sherrard,
and Cramer, to assume control of Basic on
the theory that as the remaining incorporators, they were the only members. (See
Corp. Code, § 104.) Cramer did not attend
the meeting, and Coon and Sherrard adopted a resolution amending Basic's by-laws
to provide that only the remaining incorporators were members.
On May 4, 1967 the board of directors
adopted new by-laws, which provided for
memberships. No new members, however,
have been admitted pursuant to these by~
laws.
On May 16, 1967 Coon and Sherrard
brought this action for declaratory relief
seeking to establish that Coon was a member, that directors Freeman, Seeley, and
Hickman were not members, and that the
action taken at the meeting of April 20,
1967 was binding on Basic. The directors
and Basic cross-complained. They sought
a declaration that only the directors and
Sherrard were members, that the action
taken at the meeting of April 20 was invalid, and that the by-laws adopted by the
directors at the meeting of May 4 were the
by-laws of Basic. The trial court entered
judgment for Basic and its directors.
[1] Section 104 of the Corporations
Code, a provision of the General Corporation Law (Corp.Code, tid. 1, div. 1), provides that" 'Member' -includes each person
signing the articles of a nonstoek corporation and each person admitted to membership therein." Section 9002 of the Corporations Code, a provision of the General
Nonprofit Corporation Law (Corp. Code,
tit. 1, div. 2, pt. 1), provides that "The provisions of the General Corporation Law
* * * apply to corporations formed under
this part, except as to matters specifically
otherwise provided for in this part." On
the basis of these sections Coon and Sherrard contend that as incorporators they are
members of Basic. The directors and Basic contend, however, that the membership
of Basic is a matter specifically otherwise

provided for by section 9603 of the Corporations Code, a provision of the same part
that includes section 9002.
'Section 9603 provides that "Where neither the articles nor by-laws of a nonprofit
corporation provide for members thereof
as such, and in any case in which any nODprofit corporation has, in fact, no members
other than the persons constituting its
board of directors, the persons for the time
being constituting its governing body or
board are, for the purpose of any statutory
provision or rule of law relating to non~
profit corporations, the members of the
corporation and shall exercise all the rights
and powers of members thereof."
Until the meeting of May 4, at which the
directors adopted new by-laws providing
for members, neither the articles nor the
by-laws of Basic provided for "members
* * * as such." The directors were
therefore the members of Basic pursuant to
section 9603.
Coon and Sherrard contend, however,
that section 9603 should not be interpreted
to conflict with section 104, that therefore
incorporators should be deemed members,
and that accordingly, section 9603 is not
operative unless there are no incorporators
or members other than the persons constituting the board of directors. They would
thus rewrite section 9603 by deleting the
words "in any case in which any nonprofit
corporation" and inserting in lieu thereof
the words "when it," so that the section
would read: "Where neither the articles
nor by-laws of a nonprofit corporation
provide for members thereof as such, and
[when it] has, in fact, no members other
than the persons constituting its board of
directors, the persons * * * constituting
its board are * * * the members." Only
the most compelling considerations could
justify such a departure from the language
of the statute. (See Silver v. Brown (1966)
63 Ca1.2d 841, 845, 48 Ca1.Rptr. 609, 409 P.
2d 689.) There are no such considerations
in this case.
Section 9603 provides for the orderly
manageme~t of a nonprofit corporation. If
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no prOVlS10n for members is contained in

the articles or by-laws, the directors become the members. Although the articles
or by-laws provide for members, if none
have been admitted or all have terminated
their membership, this section applies and
the directors are members.

Coon and Sherrard contend that although section 104 is included in the General Corporation Law, it now applies only
to nonprofit corporations (see 2 Ballantine
& Sterling, California Corporation Laws
(4th ed.) § 409), and should therefore be
deemed part of the General Nonprofit
Corporation Law. As such, they conclude,
it should not be automatically displaced
pursuant to section 9002 by inconsistent

language in section 9603. To hold otherwise, they urge, would render section 104
meaningless. Even if we should assume,
however, that section 104 applies only to
nonprofit corporations, our giving effect to
the plain language of section 9603 does not
render section 104 meaningless. Section
9603 assumes that there are persons constituting the board of directors. Cases may
arise when there are no such persons and
section 9603 could not apply. Section 104
would then operate to make any existing
incorporators members and thus reduce the
possibility that a nonprofit corporation
might be left with no one responsible for
its affairs.
Coon and Sherrard contend that section
104 must be given effect to provide members other than the directors to prevent the
directors from abusing their powers.
There is nothing in section 104, however,
to indicate any such purpose. Moreover, if
the existence of incorporators as members
precluded section 9603 from constituting
2. The concluding paragraph in the certificate of amendment stated: "The COrporation bad admitted no members other than

the directors as the members when neither
the articles nor by-laws provided for mem~
bers, power would be concentrated in an
ever dwindling group of incorporators and
the risks of abuse of power would thereby
be enhanced. Indeed, in the present case,
Coon and Sherrard as a majority of the
three remaining incorporators sought to
wrest control of Basic from the five-mem~
ber board of directors that had been elected to conduct Basic's affairs.

[2] Finally, Coon and Sherrard contend
that Basic should bc estopped to deny that
they are both members, on the ground that
they were described as such in a 1964
resolution" that added article 6 to the articles of incorporation to provide that "In
the event of' dissolution, all the remaining
assets of this Corporation will be distributed to an organization exempt from Federal income tax as an organization described in section 501(c) (3) of the United
States Code." That resolution was adopted, however, before this controversy arose
and at a time when both Coon and Sherrard were directors and therefore members
pursuant to section %03. The recitals in
the resolution were accurate, and there is
no evidence that Coon or Sherrard were
misled thereby or in any way changed their
position to their detritnent in reliance
thereon. Accordingly, no basis for an est~ppel appears. (Driscoll v. City of Los
Angeles (1967), 67 Cal2d 297, 305, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 431 P.2d 245 and cases there cited.)
The judgment is affirmed.
McCOMB,
PETERS,
TOBRINER,
MOSK, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ.,
concur.
the incorporators and that the undersigned incorporators are members of the
Board of Directors of said corporation."

